The Useless Iconoclast

A cou­ple of months ago, I started typ­ing up a long post bash­ing David Goldhill’s Atlantic Monthly cover story on health care that every­body was laud­ing (espe­cially David Brooks). The arti­cle had appeared in the midst of August, when health care reform was on the ropes, and it seemed like just another antag­o­nist help­ing to push the process to defeat. But by Sep­tem­ber, when I was draft­ing the post, the prospects for reform had bright­ened dra­mat­i­cally. It was revived! With a pub­lic option! In the Sen­ate, even! So I put my post away.

Another arti­cle, in the New Yorker this time, is get­ting my dan­der up again. (OK, it’s a blog post, but for any other pub­li­ca­tion it would have been an article.)

These arti­cles per­pet­u­ate the belief ram­pant in jour­nal­ism that sys­temic change hap­pens in sweep­ing ges­tures. And very, very occa­sion­ally, it does. But over the past 90 years, almost every sweep­ing change pro­posed to over­haul the health care sys­tem has gone down to crush­ing defeat. The real changes have been step by step, bit by bit. Even Medicare when enacted was a mere con­do­lence for the death of the com­pre­hen­sive insur­ance sys­tem Tru­man had envi­sioned 20 years before.

But the worst thing about these arti­cles is that they’re not con­tent to just paint a grander vision than is prac­ti­cal or pos­si­ble. They also spit at the seeds of change reform­ers have fought hard to embed within the leg­is­la­tion that’s proceeding.

At the heart of both Cas­sidy and Goldhill’s argu­ments is a famil­iar con­tention and one I agree with — that one of the biggest prob­lems with the US health care sys­tem is the way it dis­torts costs by shuf­fling most pay­ments for health care through a grue­some patch­work of employ­ers and pri­vate insur­ers. Gold­hill would reboot the cur­rent sys­tem in favor of a more lib­er­tar­ian solu­tion, estab­lish­ing afford­able options for cat­a­strophic cov­er­age and hand­ing out vouch­ers for indi­vid­u­als to pur­chase more rou­tine care. Cas­sidy sug­gests he’d like a more pro­gres­sive solu­tion, per­haps straight-up single-payer insurance.

If their argu­ments stopped there, I’d appre­ci­ate them. Either of these pro­pos­als could be part of a good con­ver­sa­tion about what health reform might look like in an ideal world. And I think it’s tremen­dously impor­tant that folks con­tinue to paint these alter­na­tive visions of what health care can become.

What I find most mad­den­ing about these arti­cles, though, is the pose of the lonely icon­o­clast. The way the authors pre­tend their ideas are so novel and trans­gres­sive that no one’s pointed them out until now. The way they ignore the past 90 years of attempts at health care reform. And worst, worst of all — the way they off-handedly dis­miss the real reforms that try to incor­po­rate those ideas into actual leg­is­la­tion as prag­mat­i­cally as pol­i­tics allows.

Both men frame their argu­ments as though they’re the hard-headed real­ists point­ing out the truths no one else will acknowl­edge. But both are ignor­ing (or dis­miss­ing) real­ity them­selves, not even really engag­ing with pol­i­tics as it exists in the real world.

If you don’t mind a bit of wonk­i­ness, read on.

The wonky stuff

Here’s John Cassidy’s nut graf:

So what does it all add up to? The U.S. gov­ern­ment is mak­ing a costly and open-ended com­mit­ment to help pro­vide health cov­er­age for the vast major­ity of its cit­i­zens. I sup­port this com­mit­ment, and I think the fed­eral government’s spend­ing pri­or­i­ties should be altered to make it hap­pen. But let’s not pre­tend that it isn’t a big deal, or that it will be self-financing, or that it will work out exactly as planned. It won’t.

Many Demo­c­ra­tic insid­ers know all this, or most of it. What is really unfold­ing, I sus­pect, is the sce­nario that many con­ser­v­a­tives feared. The Obama Admin­is­tra­tion, like the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion before it (and many other Admin­is­tra­tions before that) is cre­at­ing a new enti­tle­ment pro­gram, which, once estab­lished, will be vir­tu­ally impos­si­ble to rescind. At some point in the future, the fis­cal con­se­quences of the reform will have to be dealt with in a more mean­ing­ful way, but by then the prin­ci­ple of (near) uni­ver­sal cov­er­age will be well estab­lished. Even a twenty-first-century Ronald Rea­gan will have great dif­fi­cult over­turn­ing it.

Even if you agree with Cassidy’s pre­dic­tive analy­sis — that Con­gress is likely to scut­tle the aspects of the health reform bills that are intended to hold down costs or pay for reform over the long term1 — you should begin won­der­ing why he’s crit­i­ciz­ing the leg­is­la­tion, and not Con­gress’ will­ing­ness to fol­low through on it.

He gives a nod to the prac­ti­cal chal­lenges of reform:

The pro­posed reform may be the most that can be accom­plished today. But we will be deal­ing with its con­se­quences for decades to come, and I think it’s impor­tant to be clear about what the reform amounts to.

But then he goes on to say that the bill is fis­cally unsus­tain­able, pre­tend­ing that all seri­ous attempts to con­trol costs have already been thrown out the win­dow. To do this, he has to do a lit­tle two-stepping. Note how he elides the dis­tinc­tion between the two cham­bers of Con­gress in this paragraph:

If it decides to forgo soak­ing the rich, the Admin­is­tra­tion could return to its ear­lier pro­posal, which was included in a Sen­ate Finance Com­mit­tee bill that Sen­a­tor Max Bau­cus put for­ward, to tax firms that pro­vide their employ­ees with costly “Cadil­lac” health-care plans. “A pol­icy such as this is prob­a­bly the num­ber one item that health econ­o­mists across the ide­o­log­i­cal spec­trum believe is likely to stem the explo­sion of health-care costs,” Chris­tine Romer, the chair of the White House Coun­cil of Eco­nomic Advis­ers, said in a recent speech. But this idea wouldn’t work polit­i­cally, either. To raise enough rev­enue, the tax on swanky insur­ance plans would have to be set as high as forty per cent. When labor unions, some of whose mem­bers enjoy cov­er­age in these plans, learned about this puni­tive levy they objected loudly, prompt­ing [Speaker of the House Nancy] Pelosi to drop the idea, which, broadly speak­ing, amounts to tax­ing the upper mid­dle class to pro­vide ben­e­fits for the lower mid­dle class. [Empha­sis mine.]

In fact, the Sen­ate tax on high-value health-care plans remains … in the Sen­ate ver­sion of the bill, where it orig­i­nated.2 Pelosi, of course, doesn’t have the power to change the Sen­ate bill before leg­is­la­tion is passed in both cham­bers and reconciled.

Fun­da­men­tally, Cas­sidy just doesn’t believe Con­gress will do what it says it will. And that’s fine, healthy skep­ti­cism. But that’s nei­ther an argu­ment for short-circuiting reform, or an excuse for mis­rep­re­sent­ing the leg­is­la­tion. His argu­ment really con­cerns a break­down in the process of gov­ern­ment. But he’s not bold enough to crit­i­cize that process, or to rec­om­mend the sort of struc­tural change that could force Con­gress to fol­low through — a super­ma­jor­ity require­ment for alter­ing the leg­is­la­tion down the line, for example.

Instead, he jumps on an easy band­wagon, and just blames the legislation.

Goldhill’s “novel” idea for blow­ing up the US health care sys­tem con­forms to the basic struc­ture of the Healthy Amer­i­cans Act, also known as the Wyden-Bennett bill. This was one of the first pieces of health reform leg­is­la­tion out of the gate this year, and wonks loved it. It was deficit-neutral in its first year (i.e. it com­pletely paid for itself), and reduced the deficit within 10 years. It blew up the employer-based sys­tem entirely, and empow­ered indi­vid­u­als with tax cred­its to pur­chase their own cov­er­age. Mes­sirs Wyden and Ben­nett are Demo­c­ra­tic and Repub­li­can sen­a­tors respec­tively, so the bill had bipar­ti­san bona fides.

But it was way too rad­i­cal to make any head­way. One of the polit­i­cal real­i­ties reform­ers have had to grap­ple with is the fact that our byzan­tine health insur­ance sys­tem is now so solidly entrenched that vast, sud­den change is not pos­si­ble. The major­ity of Amer­i­cans who have employer-sponsored health insur­ance or Medicare really don’t want their cov­er­age to change. In addi­tion, large indus­tries have built them­selves up around the sta­tus quo. For most of a cen­tury, US Pres­i­dents from Tru­man to Nixon to Clin­ton have tried to effect vastly ambi­tious reforms that have grad­u­ally been whit­tled down to the leg­is­la­tion we’re debat­ing today — cer­tainly less ambi­tious up-front, but secretly con­tain­ing the poten­tial cat­a­lysts for long-term change. This is why we are as close to enact­ing health reform as we are.

David Gold­hill doesn’t men­tion Wyden-Bennett. He doesn’t even throw a bone to Wyden’s pared-down amend­ment to the Sen­ate bill, which 1) at least had a chance polit­i­cally, and 2) would have done a lot to tilt the final leg­is­la­tion in the direc­tion Gold­hill pre­scribes. He just tosses out asser­tions such as, “These ideas stand well out­side the emerg­ing polit­i­cal con­sen­sus about reform,” and walks away.

Goldhill’s arti­cle is filled with these omis­sions. His sole acknowl­edg­ment of health care sys­tems abroad — many of which are bet­ter than the US health care sys­tem by any rea­son­able mea­sure of effec­tive­ness or cost — is this lit­tle nugget:

The expe­ri­ence of other rich nations should also make us skep­ti­cal. What­ever their his­to­ries, nearly all devel­oped coun­tries are now strug­gling with rapidly ris­ing health-care costs, includ­ing those with single-payer sys­tems. From 2000 to 2005, per capita health-care spend­ing in Canada grew by 33 per­cent, in France by 37 per­cent, in the U.K. by 47 percent—all com­pa­ra­ble to the 40 per­cent growth expe­ri­enced by the U.S. in that period. Cost con­trol by way of bureau­cratic price con­trols has its limits.

Express­ing health care spend­ing growth in per­cent­ages obscures the fact that we spend much, much more on health care as a share of GDP than any of these coun­tries. As Ezra Klein explains:

The author is quite sur­prised that the U.K.‘s spend­ing growth out­paces ours. But of course it does. The U.K. spends $2,992 per per­son. The U.S. spends $7,290 per per­son. To put this in real terms, the U.S.‘s 5.8 per­cent growth works out to a $422 increase per per­son. The U.K.‘s 6.9 per­cent growth is a $206 increase per per­son. Which would you pre­fer? More­over, the U.K.‘s sys­tem is under­funded, and in recent years, the British gov­ern­ment has been try­ing to increase spend­ing. That’s not true with the Amer­i­can sys­tem, which is over­funded (although in recent years, the gov­ern­ment has also been increas­ing spending).

Peter Orszag would love to have our per-capita health-care spend­ing approach U.K. lev­els. Can you just imag­ine? We’d spend a third of what we do today! Talk about fis­cally sustainable.

Again, Gold­hill fails to engage seri­ously with real-world, work­ing exam­ples of bet­ter health care. He just paints his lib­er­tar­ian dream as though it’s the only hope for real reform. And he leaves us with this:

I hope that what­ever reform is finally enacted this fall works—preventing peo­ple from slip­ping through the cracks, rais­ing the qual­ity stan­dard of the health-care indus­try, and deliv­er­ing all this at accept­able cost. But look­ing at the big pic­ture, I fear it won’t. So I think we should at least begin to debate and think about larger reforms, and a dif­fer­ent direction—if not for this round of reform, then for the next one. Pol­i­tics is, of course, the art of the pos­si­ble. If our health-care cri­sis does not abate, the pos­si­bil­i­ties for reform may expand beyond their cur­rent, tight limits.

Hav­ing bashed the ongo­ing effort at reform, then, hav­ing not even sifted through the var­i­ous piles of leg­is­la­tion for a scrap that might favor his approach, Gold­hill wants to spark the debate about “the next round of reform.” Really? What on earth makes him think that after 90 years, we’ll finally get the polit­i­cal will to scrap our health-care sys­tem? And that next time around, reform­ers will scour the archives of the Atlantic to find his oh-so-unique approach? Our system’s been “in cri­sis” for­ever. Why won’t reform just con­tinue to fol­low the tra­jec­tory it has — an ever-diminishing plan, whit­tled down every 15 years or so until it finally lacks enough ambi­tion to pass?

The hard part

This ugly com­bi­na­tion of cyn­i­cism with the most vapid ide­al­ism is what breeds inaction.

Being the lonely icon­o­clast is just so much eas­ier than both­er­ing with nuance and process. It’s harder to make an Atlantic cover story around “Why Ron Wyden’s Free Choice Amend­ment Is So Essen­tial” than to make it around “Why We Should Ignore Reform and Plot to Bring About My Lib­er­tar­ian Utopia.” Fight­ing for a deeply flawed plan that’s much bet­ter than the sta­tus quo is far harder than throw­ing up your hands when it lacks a strong pub­lic option.

Real bold­ness — on the part of both Gold­hill and Cas­sidy — would have involved tak­ing a hard look at the process that’s taken us this long to get an out­come this mediocre. Crit­i­ciz­ing the leg­is­la­tion itself is a cheap thrill. Call­ing out the sys­temic flaws requires some rad­i­cal­ism. This is why I love Hen­drik Hertzberg. He’s been out there for decades, flog­ging the National Pop­u­lar Vote ini­tia­tive every chance he gets. Sloooowly, the idea is spread­ing, and one day, it or its suc­ces­sors might just change the country.

To end this rant, I’m quot­ing H.W. Brands again:

The one trait the Founders shared to the great­est degree is the one most worth striv­ing after today — but also one that is often for­got­ten in the praise of their asserted genius. These men were no smarter than the best their coun­try can offer now; they weren’t wiser or more altru­is­tic. They may have been more learned in a clas­si­cal sense, but they knew much less about the nat­ural world, includ­ing the nat­ural basis of human behav­ior. They were, how­ever, far bolder than we are. When they signed the Dec­la­ra­tion of Inde­pen­dence, they put their necks in a noose; when they wrote the Con­sti­tu­tion, they embarked on an auda­cious and unprece­dented chal­lenge to cus­tom and author­ity. For their courage they cer­tainly deserve our admi­ra­tion. But even more they deserve our emulation.

1 — This analy­sis itself is sus­pect. Cassidy’s main pre­dic­tion is that the CBO scores for the leg­is­la­tion likely to be signed into law are wildly opti­mistic. But his­tory shows us the reverse: “Over the last two decades, the CBO has rou­tinely over­es­ti­mated the costs of expanded gov­ern­ment health care ben­e­fits and under­es­ti­mated the sav­ings from pro­gram changes designed to reduce expen­di­tures.” It’s not a par­ti­san thing, either; the CBO over­es­ti­mated the five-year cost of Pres­i­dent Bush’s Medicare drug ben­e­fit by more than 35%.
2 — The tax has shifted slightly; it’s no longer a tax on employ­ers, but an excise tax on insur­ers. Here, Ezra Klein talks a bit about the dif­fer­ence between the House tax (on income over $500k a year) and the Sen­ate tax (on high-value health plans). Gen­er­ally, the Sen­ate has been more hawk­ish about cov­er­ing costs, and the bill that emerged from the Finance Com­mit­tee and will form the spine of the Sen­ate floor leg­is­la­tion goes fur­ther than the House bill to try to pay for health reform with rev­enues incurred within the health-care sys­tem, rather than with income taxes or other non-health-care-related means.

2 Responses

    Tim says:

    Is this a dis­ease of pol­i­tics, jour­nal­ism, or both? I’m lean­ing jour­nal­ism — when folks strike this pose in pol­i­tics, it’s usu­ally to get jour­nal­ists to write about them. And you cer­tainly see it in sto­ries well out­side of pol­i­tics. Ron Rosen­baum had an arti­cle about Han­nah Arendt that was dis­hon­est in just this way; there was also an NYT op-Ed on teacher edu­ca­tion with the same sins, ampli­fied even. 

    It’s strange that print jour­nal­ists fall for this style of writing/unthinking as or even more often than blog­gers, who are depen­dent on pageviews and who don’t have edi­tors to point out that they’ve missed a well­known chunk of the story. I think it has some­thing to do with 1) print jour­nal­ists try­ing to meet dead­lines and 2) blog­gers’ need to build a brand by estab­lish­ing their cre­den­tials over time. They don’t need to bet it all on one allegedly paradigm-shifting arti­cle. Some­one like Ezra Klein not only wouldn’t write this; they wouldn’t need to write this. 

    Sadly, aca­d­e­mics make the same mis­take. Every­one is always rad­i­cally chal­leng­ing a straw-man con­sen­sus that doesn’t exist, always speak­ing truth to power (where power is a lit­er­ary critic who died eighty years ago). The rhetoric of risk, care­fully deployed so as to actu­ally risk noth­ing, ever, not a sin­gle live idea.

    Tim Carmody says:

    I should clar­ify: there are some rea­sons why blog­gers don’t fall into this trap more often, not that they don’t fall into it. Again, pageviews or the ide­o­log­i­cal need for fake con­trar­i­an­ism can make you recy­cle old CW as the new dar­ing icon­o­clasm. See this series on “Three Para­doxes of the Inter­net Age,” for instance…

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