Rethinking the self

I’ve seen sev­eral blog­gers link, approv­ingly, to some of David Brooks’ recent columns on psy­chol­ogy and neu­ro­science, and I’ll join them. I think this con­ver­sa­tion couldn’t be more fas­ci­nat­ing, mostly because it’s a new one. This isn’t just a nice sci­en­tific tux to dress up old (“eter­nal”) ideas; some of these new notions about how the brain works (or, often, how it doesn’t work) are truly new.

And some of them are truly chal­leng­ing. What if con­scious­ness isn’t the pilot but rather the spin doc­tor, com­ing up with sto­ries to explain your actions only after other, sub­tler fac­ul­ties have already com­mit­ted you to them? Con­scious­ness as giant ret­con.

What if there’s not one Robin—expressed in lots of inter­est­ing ways, of course—but instead a whole com­mit­tee, always argu­ing over whether to actu­ally write some­thing or just post a snazzy image? As Paul Bloom puts it, by way of Brooks, maybe our many selves “are con­tin­u­ally pop­ping in and out of exis­tence. They have dif­fer­ent desires, and they fight for control—bargaining with, deceiv­ing, and plot­ting against one another.”

I always think of that claim—who made it? Howard Bloom?—that Shake­speare lit­er­ally invented mod­ern West­ern con­scious­ness. The rev­o­lu­tion that was Shakespeare’s char­ac­ter­i­za­tion pro­vided a tem­plate that was so seduc­tive, so viral, that it ultimately—after influ­enc­ing and infect­ing lots of other writers—became one of the very foun­da­tions of our com­mon sense about con­scious­ness, iden­tity, will, and every­thing else. (I’m prob­a­bly man­gling Bloom’s idea. Oh well: It’s my man­gled ver­sion that I find so compelling.)

That’s totally mag­i­cal, but it’s also totally arbi­trary. So maybe it’s time for another sea change (Shake­speare!) in the way we think about our­selves. It doesn’t take much to make a big dif­fer­ence; these are the axioms we build our lives around, so if you change one just a lit­tle bit, the rip­ple effects are massive.

In any case, I’m glad a big-time colum­nist is bring­ing these ideas to cen­ter stage. I do wish there was a forum that was slightly more tech­ni­cal; I don’t want to read the jour­nals, or even any­thing close to them, really, but I would like to go beyond the too-clean op-ed metaphors that Brooks is bound to by necessity.

12 Responses

    Andrew says:

    We are all strange loops.

    This con­scious­ness as ret­con idea is fas­ci­nat­ing, but I think that its less use­ful for our every­day inter­ac­tion than the “Shake­spearean” sense of Human.

    When deal­ing on the macro scale, it’s good to know that Quan­tum Elec­tro Dynam­ics is there, but New­ton­ian physics will work just fine.

    Tim says:

    I think it was Leib­niz who argued that an essen­tial fea­ture of con­scious­ness is that it is pre­sented or deliv­ered to the sub­ject. Hei­deg­ger makes fun of him, jok­ing that Leib­niz turns con­scious­ness into a kind of letter-carrier of the mind: “we a
    speak of the deliv­ery of mail.” (Bern­hard Siegert tells this story in his book Relays, a philosophical/literary his­tory of the post.)

    What if all con­scious­ness is is the deliv­ery agent, the pro­jec­tor reg­is­ter­ing the mil­lions of main­frame oper­a­tions of the mind? Actu­ally, “pro­jec­tor” might be too gen­er­ous — it’s more like the paper print­outs old com­put­ers used to register/communicate their out­put. The com­puter whirrs and clicks, hums and flashes, and then you hear that dot matrix buzz, and walk around to the front to tear off a sheet of paper that reads, “unknown input — error in line 387.” :)

    Saheli says:

    I think the key to down­grad­ing innate cul­tural hos­til­ity to peo­ple per­ceiv­ing them­selves as a mul­ti­tude is dis­cussing a vari­ety of rela­tion­ships within that par­tic­u­lar mul­ti­tude. I vehe­mently resist think­ing of myself as mul­ti­ple peo­ple par­tially because when I encounter oth­ers (in real life and in art) who present them­selves as that, the per­sonae seem to either be inco­her­ently switch­ing places, actively hos­tile to each other, invoked for the sake of blame, or all three. The main excep­tion is talk­ing to one’s past (“a let­ter to my 13-year old self”), a fre­quent trope on TV shows too. It’s very rare for alter­nate per­son­al­i­ties to be seen as get­ting along and hang­ing out and har­mo­niz­ing. (There was that cheezy show about the inside of someone’s brain, I guess.)

    Saheli says:

    Though a notable excep­tion: in my *reli­gion,* lots of Per­son­al­i­ties have mul­ti­tudes of aspects/personae that “hang out with each other” and it’s any­thing but unappealing.

    Also, I seem to have screwed up the thread­ing. This was in response to Penniman.

    Matt Penniman says:

    My com­mit­tee finds this idea attrac­tive. What hap­pens when we start speak­ing of our selves in the plural? We already do this to some extent: peo­ple tend to talk about other people’s intox­i­cated behav­ior as a sep­a­rate per­sona, “a mean drunk” or “she’s a whole dif­fer­ent per­son when she’s had a few”. And the intra-personal bar­gain­ing is famil­iar to any­one who’s ever dieted or tried to write some­thing mas­sive. Maybe we’re near­ing a point where it doesn’t sound crazy to talk about your­self as con­tain­ing multitudes.

    Tim Carmody says:

    I don’t know if we’re multiple/plural, so much as we are reflex­ively opaque. I am per­form­ing oper­a­tions that I am not aware of; I see no need, short of a Tyler-Durden-esque lapse of san­ity, to posit addi­tional enti­ties. We have bac­te­ria and other organ­isms liv­ing in our gut, with­out which we couldn’t func­tion; but it still seems lucid to refer to our­selves as sin­gle phys­i­cal entities. 

    At any rate, it’s also clear to me that our ability/demand to refer to our­selves in the sin­gu­lar is based on 1) lin­guis­tic con­ven­tions that dis­tin­guish between speak­ers, not selves, and 2) our rel­a­tive bod­ily unity, not any sense that we have a uni­fied con­scious­ness or an atomic and irre­ducible soul. Some­one like Niet­zsche, Freud, or James would call this an illu­sion, con­di­tioned by gram­mar, the body, and the fact that what con­scious­ness DOES present to us is so rich, allow­ing us to per­ceive, delib­er­ate, dif­fer­en­ti­ate, and self-reflect.

    Tim Carmody says:

    PS — if you’re look­ing for a slightly more smarty-pants dis­til­la­tion of cur­rent brain and neu­ro­science research — and really, even if you’re not — you have GOT to be read­ing Jonah Lehrer’s blog The Frontal Cor­tex. It’s con­sis­tently among my five or six must-reads.

    Robin Sloan says:

    Word. Didn’t even know about it. RSS’d.

    Tim Carmody says:

    Dude, I can’t believe you didn’t know about Jonah Lehrer’s blog. I link to it in my Snark­mar­ket posts some­thing like once a week. If you count Twit­ter, it’s eas­ily more.

    (Sniff) Robin doesn’t read… (Sniff!) my links… (Honk!)

    (more likely, he doesn’t pay atten­tion to where I’m send­ing him)

    Robin Sloan says:

    Yeah, when I do click through, it is in a mad infor­ma­tion syn­the­siz­ing fury. My vision lit­er­ally blurs. I can’t see the browser address bar, can’t see the blog header. Everything’s cov­ered in a red mist.

    Rod says:

    So, let me get this straight… it’s like Herman’s Head?
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pE489rs0fPA

    Saheli says:

    Oh man, I can’t believe I actu­ally remem­bered what the brain char­ac­ters looked like.

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